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INTRODUCTION

Much of the nation's technology is developed in public institutions, especially universities and government research laboratories, and is freely available through libraries and classrooms.
Roughly one-half of total United States research and development expenditures are funded by the United States Government,
and the findings from this research are generally available to citizens and foreigners at little or no charge. In addition, a great deal
of technology that was once guarded by patents or trade secrets
has since passed into the public domain. This paper ignores these
freely available segments of the national technology base and discusses proprietary technology.
A.

The Generation and Diffusion of ProprietaryTechnology

The useful application of proprietary technology has two distinct but related phases: generation and diffusion. The process of
diffusion can be separated into diffusion within the country and
diffusion across international borders. In the United States, the
generation of industrial technology largely results from the research and development efforts of private firms in the expectation
of commercial reward.1 The level of commercial reward is influenced both by direct government subsidies to private firms and

1. See Hufbauer & Blake, Industrial Technology in Foreign Affairs: A Tour
of U.S. Government Policy, in INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: THlE

POLICY GAP (G. Tolley ed. 1979). The system of commercial reward accomplishes
two useful purposes: it discourages the development of technology which has no
social use, and it provides both funds and incentive for new discoveries.
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by tax incentives. In addition, the conditions governing diffusion
influence what portion of the benefits of new technology can be
captured as a commercial reward. If diffusion takes place freely
and instantly, commercial returns to the inventing company will
be small. If diffusion is controlled for decades by the inventing
firm, the private return will approach, and possibly even exceed,
the social rate of return.2
The rate of technology diffusion within the United States is affected by the following three legal mechanisms: the patent system, the legal protection for trade secrets, and the antitrust limits
on contractual terms in technology licensing agreements. By contrast, the rate of technology diffusion between the United States
and foreign nations is affected by six legal mechanisms. The first
legal mechanism is export licensing, both of products and of
plans. Export controls are usually imposed for national security
or foreign policy reasons. They apply both to trade in specific
items with potential military applications and to a broader range
of items destined for the Soviet bloc and other hostile nations.
The second control tool is the patent law. The statutory conditons for granting a patent are structured so that foreign inventors have an incentive to patent their inventions within the
United States at an early date if they want United States patent
protection. In addition, United States patent law contains reciprocity features that favor residents of nations adhering to the
Paris Convention. Further, section 337 of the Trade Act of 1974
contains mechanisms to protect United States inventors against
the use of pirated United States technology for the manufacture
of goods abroad and their subsequent exportation to the United
States market. The third control tool is tax policy. On the whole,
international tax rules are not designed to encourage or discourage the flow of technology. Deviations from tax neutrality between technology income earned abroad and technology income
earned in the United States usually reflect the exigencies of
meshing the United States and foreign tax systems. Nevertheless,
some of these deviations are important enough to influence the
2. Studies by Mansfield and others have attempted to measure the commercial and social rates of return from research and development spending. These
studies tend to show higher social rates of return for research and development
projects than private rates of return. E.g., Mansfield, Rapaport, Romeo, Wagner
& Beardsley, Social and Private Rates of Return from Industrial Innovations,
Q. J. ECON., May 1977.
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flow of technology. The fourth control tool, again indirect, is
financial policy. The United States operates the following programs to provide official credits and guarantees for sales and investment abroad: the Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation, the Foreign Military Sales Program, the
Economic Support Fund, the Agency for International Development, and the Commodity Credit Corporation. To some extent,
these programs differentially encourage the export of technology.
The fifth control tool is import policy as revealed in the structure
of tariffs, quotas, and administered protection. Again, this is
largely an indirect tool. To the extent that the United States imposes high tariffs or restrictive quotas on imports of low technology goods, it burdens the production and export of high technology goods and vice versa. The sixth control tool is United States
antitrust law. Technology licensing agreements that contain excessively restrictive conditions on the sale of the final product or
the purchase of intermediate inputs can offend the antitrust laws
and lead firms to decide between producing through controlled
foreign corporations or not producing outside the United States
at all.
This essay comments briefly on only three of the six legal
mechanisms, the licensing, financing, and taxation of technology
transfer. Technology transfer is not a lead topic around which
United States policy has been organized. Rather, legal controls
over the transfer of technology have been erected by a process of
accretion, and the evolution and administration of those controls
has been consigned to a number of different agencies. Nevertheless, it is possible to detect three weakly implemented organizing
principles that have influenced the development of the legal
mechanisms. These are geography, the extent of post-transfer
control remaining in the hands of United States persons, and the
extent to which technology is transferred in disembodied form,
such as the sale of patent rights, or embodied form, such as the
sale of equipment that incorporates new production features.
These organizing principles reflect two underlying considerations.
First, any country that plays the technology control game must
attempt to compartmentalize the destination of its technology.
Second, the scope for controls diminishes as the foreign availability of technology grows.
B.

GeographicalConsiderations

Geography is a euphemism for the politico-military coloration
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of various regions. For technology transfer purposes, the most im-

portant geographical axes are East-West, West-West, and NorthSouth. Military security is the overriding issue characterizing
East-West transfers. Motivated largely by security considerations,
the United States relies on export controls and financing restrictions to regulate the flow of goods and services to the Soviet bloc.
Despite these restrictions, the past decade has witnessed a dramatic expansion in United States-Soviet bloc commercial relations. For example, combined trade between the United States
and the Soviet Union grew from virtually zero in 1970 to $2.8 billion in 1978 and then, with the Afghanistan invasion, declined to
about $1.2 billion in 1980.3
Economic neutrality characterizes United States policy toward
West-West transfers to industrialized noncommunist nations.
This policy of neither encouraging nor discouraging technology
transfers reflects the basic free trade and open investment attitude of the United States. Nevertheless, debate continues over
the wisdom of technology transfer. Some observers contend that
the United States should husband its technological resources and
concentrate on exporting products, not know-how. Other observers note that it is virtually impossible to prevent the dissemination of knowledge, that technology transfers are increasingly a
two-way proposition, and that the free international sale of existing technology provides financial resources for the generation
of new technology.
North-South transfers of technology are characterized by a gap
between rhetoric and reality. Developing countries believe they
have a right to the know-how of the developed countries on a royalty-free basis: "They claim that their right of access to technology which they regard as the 'common heritage of mankind' has
been limited and restricted unreasonably and that this is the
main reason for their being underdeveloped.' The United States
and other industrial nations must balance domestic concerns
against this perceived right. Through a number of financing windows, the United States enables developing countries to obtain
United States technology at concessional prices, but United
3.

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,

U.S.

DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT

864 (1979), and author's estimates for 1980.
4. J. Ney, Jr., Technology TransferPolicies, IsSUEs IN EAST-WEST COMMERCIAL RELATIONS, JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS. 18 (Comm.
Print 1979).
OF THE UNITED STATES
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States firms are seldom willing to surrender their technology for
no commercial reward. United States labor unions are concerned
about possible job losses resulting from foreign production supported by technology transfers. Because these are important issues, the Congress has called for a study of the domestic economic consequences of foreign technology transfers.'
C. Post-Transfer Control
Whether in an East-West, West-West, or North-South context,
technology may be transferred in various ways. The means of international technology transfer can be arrayed according to the
extent of control after the transfer takes place. At one extreme is
direct investment in a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary, including
subsidiaries established to perform research and development
abroad. Next are technology transfers to a foreign subsidiary in
which the United States firm holds a controlling interest, but collaborates with a minority partner. Next are technology transfers
to a foreign venture in which the United States firm holds only a
minority interest. Then come licenses to unrelated firms. Straight
sales of a new product or sophisticated equipment that enables
the purchaser to improve his own technological capabilities are
next. Last, technology may be transferred by imitation abroad,
with no commercial transaction in products or plans.
An excellent statistical survey on the various forms of technology transfer is prepared annually by the National Science Foundation.6 For present purposes, a brief summary will suffice.
United States direct investment abroad reached a book value of
nearly $200 billion in 1980 and in recent years has grown at a rate
of about ten percent "annually.7 The largest portion of this outward investment is in manufacturing, with machinery and chemicals the most important industries." Foreign direct investment in
the United States reached a book value of about $60 billion in
1980.9 In the past three years, the growth rate of inward invest5. Export Administration Amendment of 1977, H.R. 5840, Sec. 118.
6. Bond, InternationalIndicators of Science and Technology, in NATIONAL
SCIENCE FOUNDATION, SCIENCE INDicATORS-1980 (1980).

7. Wichard, U.S. Direct Investment Abroad in 1979, SURVEY OF CURRENT

BusiNlss, 16-36 (Aug. 1980), and author's estimates for 1980.
8. Id. at 27.
9. Chung & Fouch, ForeignDirect Investment in the United States in 1979,
SURVEY OF CURRENT BusiNEss 38-51 (Aug. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Chung &
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ment has doubled to roughly twenty percent per year.10 As with
outward investment, the largest proportion of inward investment
is in manufacturing, with chemicals and machinery in the
forefront.11
United States and foreign licensing arrangements also exhibit a
reciprocal pattern of technology transfer. United States companies' net receipts (receipts minus payments) of royalties and fees
from foreign affiliates approached $3 billion in 1980.12 Manufacturing activity generates the largest proportion of these receipts,
with machinery and chemicals again the most important individual industries.13 Foreign parent firms also provide technology to
United States affiliates as evidenced by the level of net payments
of royalties and fees (payments less receipts) of United States affiliates of about $0.5 billion in 1980.14 The research and development effort of these foreign affiliates probably reached $3 billion
in 1980.15 The three leading industries are transportation equipment, machinery, and chemicals. 16
Based on a comparison of foreign direct investment flows, royalty and fee payments, and research and development activity,
the United States remains a net exporter of technology. These
outflows have not necessarily eroded the export position of
United States industry. The research and development-intensive
machinery and chemical industries stand at the leading edge of
the technology transfer movement, but they also account for seventy-five percent of the United States trade surplus in research
and development-intensive goods and over fifty percent of all
manufactured exports in the last twenty years.' 7
The legal structure surrounding the diffusion of technology
often distinguishes between transactions that convey technology
to independent parties and transactions that keep technology
within the corporate group. For example, a patent license that
Fouch, and author's estimates for 1980].
10. Id. at 38.
11. Id. at 47.
12. Wichard, supra note 6, at 23, and author's estimates for 1980.
13. Id. at 23, 33-36.
14. Chung & Fouch, supra note 9, at 45.
15. See S. Okubo, The Impact of Technology Transfer on the Competitiveness of U.S. Producers, 15-17 (paper presented to Trade Policy Staff Committee) (July 18, 1980):
16. Id. at 15.
17. Id. at 30.
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dictates the terms of sale of a final product or that requires the
purchase of intermediate goods may well offend the United States
antitrust laws. Similar restrictions can be imposed, however, on a
controlled subsidiary of the parent corporation with no adverse
legal consequences under United States law. As subsequent sections indicate, technology transfer control mechanisms also distinguish between transfers to strangers and transfers within the
family.
D. Embodied v. Disembodied Technology
Nations generally prefer to sell their technology to foreigners in
the form of new products or sophisticated equipment rather than
in the form of blueprints. When equipment is exported, complementary factors of production such as labor and physical capital
are employed to a greater extent than when blueprints are exported. There is some doubt, whether or not rationally based,
that sellers of straight technology realize an adequate profit on its
transfer. The sale of blueprints and patents may give birth to a
foreign competitor much more quickly than the sale of a new
product or sophisticated equipment. While reverse engineering is
always possible, it takes more time than reading blueprints.
The preference for the sale of embodied technology finds expression in various legal control mechanisms. The Bucy Report
suggested that the United States should abandon nearly all controls on exports of goods to the Soviet Union, but should retain
and reinforce controls on the export of blueprints. The tax law
gives a larger preference margin to the sale of goods to foreigners
than to the licensing of patents. Official financing is more readily
available for the export of goods than the export of pure
technology.
II. THE LICENSING OF

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

Under the Export Administration Act of 1979, the Arms Export
Control Act of 1976, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, the United States Government exercises wide-ranging authority to control the export of
technology for national security and foreign policy reasons. The
Departments of Commerce, Defense, State, and Energy, the National Security Council, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency all play a role in
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monitoring technology exports.""
A.

Export Administration Act of 1979
1.

General Provisions

The Export Administration Act of 1979 is the central piece of
legislation regulating technology transfers from the United
States.1 9 This Act declares that it is the policy of the United
States,
(i) To restrict exports of goods and technology that would significantly contribute to the military potential of any other country in
a fashion detrimental to the national security of the United States;
(ii) To restrict exports of goods and technology where necessary
to further significantly the foreign policy of the United States; and
(iii) To restrict exports of goods where necessary to protect 2the
0
domestic economy from an excessive drain of scarce materials.
The first two policy declarations are particularly relevant in the
technology transfer context. While the Act discourages the automatic or permanent imposition of export controls, it provides ample authority for the Administration to impose ad hoc restrictions. The Act delegates to the Secretary of Commerce the
authority to establish a Commodity Control List specifying goods
and technology subject to export controls. This list identifies for
every controlled commodity the type of license required for export to each Country Group. The Act authorizes the Secretary of
Commerce to issue the following three major types of licenses:
validated licenses, authorizing a specific export, which are issued
pursuant to an application by the exporter; qualified general licenses, which authorize multiple exports issues pursuant to an
application by the exporter; and general licenses, which authorize
exports without application by the exporter.
Country Groups are maintained to distinguish different policy
criterion for different nations. For example, Country Group Y
contains the Soviet Union and most of the Eastern bloc countries,
excluding Poland and Romania. Exports of goods and technology
18. The Office of Export Administration in the Department of Commerce is

designated as the "central contact point" within the U.S. Government, 45 Fed.
Reg. 64,226.
19. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503-36
(1979).
20. Id.
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with no possible military application destined for Country Group
Y are subject to less stringent controls. If an export has potential
military application, the proposed transaction is reviewed to assess the possible detriment to United States national security.
Country Group T, which includes most countries in the Western
hemisphere except Cuba, and Country Group V, which includes
most Western industrial countries, are not generally subject to
the strict military application test.
The foreign availability of a good or technology is considered in
any decision to impose export controls. At one extreme are cases
in which the technology is available without export restrictions in
sufficient quantity and quality abroad and the technology is not
deemed vital to national security and foreign policy goals. In such
cases, the President may not impose controls. At the other extreme are cases in which the United States has a monopoly, and
foreign availability is simply not an issue. Most cases, however,
fall in a grey area in which availability is limited abroad. In these
cases, the executive branch is given discretion to determine
whether sufficient cooperation can be obtained from the Western
allies, through the auspices of the Coordinating Committee, to
make export controls worthwhile.
2.

National Security Controls

The determination whether national security controls should be
placed on the export of goods to a specific country is not based
solely on the country's geographical status. It also reflects the
country's present and potential relationship to countries friendly
or hostile to the United States and its ability to control retransfers of United States exports. The Secretary of Defense has primary responsibility for developing a list of militarily critical technologies, which becomes a part of the Commodity Control List,
but the Secretary of Commerce is assigned a secondary role in
drawing up this list. The Act also establishes a system of performance indexing to provide for annual increases in the levels of
controlled goods and technologies. Any technology not maintaining the progressively higher performance levels should, in principle, be withdrawn from the Commodity Control List.
3.

Foreign Policy Controls

The Act gives the President authority to impose export controls
for the purpose of advancing the foreign policy goals and declared

Spring 1981]

UNITED STATES POLICY

international obligations of the United States. In practice, foreign
policy controls are within the province of the Department of
State and the National Security Council. Criteria for determining
the need for controls under this section are:
(i) the probability that such controls would have the intended effect, in light particularly of the foreign availability of the
technology;
(ii) the compatibility of such controls with the foreign policy
objectives of the United States, including the effort to counter international terrorists;
(iii) the likely effect of the controls on the export performance,
competitive position, and international reputation of the United
States and of individual companies; and
(iv) the ability of the United States to enforce the proposed
controls.
B. Atomic Energy Act of 1954
The Atomic Energy Act, as implemented by the Energy Reorganization Act, prohibits United States persons from producing
nuclear materials outside the United States except in the context
of approved international cooperative arrangements or upon a determination by the Secretary of Energy "that such activity will
not be inimical to the interest of the United States." The Department of Energy is responsible for reviewing applications for specific authorizations to engage directly or indirectly in the production of nuclear material outside the United States.
The regulations require that any person wishing to engage in
production abroad shall apply for either a general or specific icense. Except in four sensitive areas general and specific authorizations generally fall along geographic lines. The four sensitive areas of activity include assistance in the design, construction,
fabrication, or operation of a nuclear reactor, a facility for the
production of heavy water, a facility for the separation of isotopes
or any source of special nuclear material, and a facility for the
processing, alloying, or production of special nuclear materials. In
these four sensitive areas, the Secretary of Energy will, with the
advice of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, determine the
suitability of an export of technology to any foreign nation.
C. Arms Export Control Act of 1976
The United States Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program is
another vehicle for potential technology transfers. Between 1970
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and 1975, FMS sales increased from $1.1 billion to $15.8 billion
annually. 21 Congress believed that greater policy control was in
order and consequently enacted the Arms Export Control Act in
1976, which consolidated existing legislation and established an
Arms Export Control Board. The Arms Export Control Act delegates to the Secretary of State authority to control the export of
commercially-sold defense articles and services. The principles
governing munitions control are outlined further in the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. The Arms Export Control
Board reviews coproduction agreements involving military
equipment.
In 1977 President Carter spelled out a policy of unilateral restraint setting qualitative and quantitative limits to United
States sales. Shortly thereafter, the President approved controversial sales of military hardware to Iran and Saudi Arabia. Elsewhere in the world, increased arms sales by France, the Soviet
Union, and other suppliers seemed to fill any void left by the new
United States policy of restraint. It is unclear what impact *the
arms restraint policy has had on the total volume of arms sales.
D. Effect of the Afghanistan Episode
Following the December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, the
President ordered the Secretary of Commerce to revise United
States policy with respect to the export of high technology items
to the Soviet Union. On May 5, 1980, the Commodity Control
List and the Advisory Notes for that list were revised to reflect
national security considerations. Certain lasers, silicone materials,
silicone deposition equipment, and semi-conductor sawing and
surface finishing equipment would be subject to the more restrictive validated licensing procedure. It was further announced that
the United States would enter into immediate negotiations to restrict the foreign availability of these goods to the Soviet Union.
The United States has since attempted to persuade its allies in
the Coordinating Committee to limit shipments of high technology goods to the Soviet Union.
E. Technology Transfers to the People's Republic of China
The United States and the People's Republic of China now per21. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES CONVENTIONAL
ARMS TRANSFER POLICY (June 1980) (unpublished as of March 1, 1981).
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ceive that their common interests will be enhanced by an expansion of United States exports of technology to China. The United
States-China Trade Agreement was an early diplomatic step towards implementing this policy. The Agreement eases the way for
the establishment of offices of United States companies in Peking. It establishes a framework for more normal banking operations between the two countries, and it ensures most-favored-nation treatment in trade between the two countries.
On April 25, 1980, the International Trade Administration
moved the People's Republic of China, for export control purposes, from Country Group Y to a new Country Group P. China
is the only member of Country Group P. The validated license
requirements for Country Group P are the same as those for
Groups Q, W, and Y, but in considering "which exports would
contribute significantly to military potential in a way which
would be detrimental to the U.S. national security, factors relevant are different from those of the Warsaw Pact countries."
On September 12, 1980, the Department of Commerce announced the new guidelines for export controls on goods and
technical data going to China:
(i) Evidence that a stated end-user is engaged in military activities will not necessarily result in denial of an application, if the
proposed export is otherwise appropriate for a stated, and accepted, end use;
(ii) Equipment and technical data specifically intended for the
design, development or manufacture of end items probably will
normally be denied if those same end products would not be
approved;
(iii) Equipment and technical data which could contribute to the
design and construction of nuclear weapons and delivery systems,
intelligence gathering or electronic warfare will not be approved;
(iv) Licenses may be approved if the equipment or data could be
used in the design, development or manufacture of tactical military
items;
(v) Licenses will be disapproved if the potential military application is so significant that the export would present an unacceptable
risk regardless of the end use;
(vi) Licenses will be disapproved unless the substance of the requirements of the Export Administration regulations concerning
end use statements and post-sale access by the supplier have been
fulfilled;
(vii) Equipment incorporating advanced technology will not be
approved if its performance exceeds requirements of the stated
civil use or approvable military application.
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III. THE TAXATION OF TECHNOLOGY TPmNSFER

Generally speaking, the tax policies of the United States and
other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD)nations are designed, on the one hand, to facilitate the
legitimate transfer of technology to foreign operations, and, on
the other hand, to discourage the artificial shifting of profits to
tax haven jurisdictions. These broad policy goals are implemented
in a number of detailed rules relating to transfer pricing, the allocation of research and development expenses, and the sale of
technology.
A.

Transfer Pricing

United States citizens, residents, and corporations are subject
to United States taxation on their worldwide income. This tax is
deferred, however, on the earnings of a foreign corporation until
they are distributed to the United States shareholder, typically a
United States parent corporation. Because of this deferral element, it is theoretically possible for a United States taxpayer to
reduce its tax liability by artificially transferring income to a controlled foreign corporation. The objective of section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code is to prevent this artificial shifting of profits.
It contains a set of intercompany pricing rules which require
goods and services to be transferred between related parties on an
arm's length basis: "The standard to be applied in every case is
that of an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's length with another uncontrolled taxpayer. 2 2 Thus, intercompany sales of patents and similar intangible property must be made on an arm's
length basis for tax purposes.
The section 482 regulations allow an exception for a bona fide
cost sharing agreement. If related parties negotiating at arm's
length each bear a share in the costs and risks of a research project, they may share proportionately in the benefits without any
additional pricing adjustment.2 3 In addition, the section 482 regulations do not apply when technology is transferred as a contribution to capital of a controlled foreign corporation.
For the great majority of transactions, the arm's length standard is the internationally accepted standard. It governs the pricing of transactions between associated enterprises in the OECD
22.

Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1).

23. Id. § 1.482-2(d)(4).
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Model Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital2 ' and
the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between
Developed and Developing Countries. 25 A recent OECD report
declared that "the general principle to be taken as the basis for
the evaluation for tax purposes of transfer prices between associated enterprises under contracts for licensing patents or knowhow is that the prices should be those which would be paid between independent enterprises acting at arm's length."2
B.

Characterizationof Earnings on Technology Sold Abroad

In the characterization area, the tax law illustrates the sometimes confusing results of separate policies introduced at different
times to deal with related but distinct aspects of the same issue.
In the sphere of foreign technology sales, two types of characterizations are at play. These are the capital gains-ordinary income
dichotomy and the United States source-foreign source income
dichotomy. The tax law distinguishes between the sale of patent
rights or the granting of an exclusive license and the nonexclusive
licensing of a patent. If a patent is sold or exclusively licensed,
the income is characterized as a capital gain even though the 2pay7
ment is partly conditioned on fature- production or profits.

If

the patent is merely licensed on a nonexclusive basis, the income
is characterized and taxed as ordinary income.
In 1962 Congress enacted section 1249 of the Internal Revenue
Code, which denies capital gains treatment if technology is sold to
a controlled fbreign corporation. A parent firm can still transfer
technology in a tax-free exchange as part of its contribution to
capital under sections 351 and 367. A sale of technology to an
unaffiliated foreign subsidiary is still taxed as capital gains income. In 1976 Congress added section 904(b), which characterizes
certain capital gains on property sold to a foreign entity as
24. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION & DEVELOPMENT,
DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION ON INCOME & ON CAPITAL art. 9(1) (1977)

MODEL

[herein-

after cited as OECD CONVENTION].
25. UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS

MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION
BETWEEN DEVELOPED & DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1980) [hereinafter cited as U.N.
CONVENTION].

26.

ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION & DEVELOPMENT, TRANSFER

PRICING AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES

FER PRICING].

27. I.R.C. § 1235.

51 (1979) [hereinafter cited as

TRANS-
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United States source income, rather than foreign source income,
unless the gains are taxed abroad at a rate of at least ten percent.
If a taxpayer finds itself in an excess foreign tax credit situation,
it may be penalized by the capital gains characterization when it
sells technology to an unaffiliated foreign entity and incurs only a
low foreign tax rate. In other words, contrary to the congressional
intent in 1962, the taxpayers might be better off with an ordinary
income-foreign source characterization than with a capital gainsUnited States source characterization.
C. Foreign Tax Credit Limit
As a unilateral method of reducing double taxation, the United
States provides a foreign tax credit for income taxes paid -by
United States persons to foreign governments. The total annual
foreign tax credit presently is about $26 billion, of which petroleum taxes account for about $18 billion.2 The two major issues
of the foreign tax credit involve the tests applied to distinguish
between creditable and noncreditable foreign taxes and the design of the foreign tax credit limit. For most purposes, only taxes
imposed on income are creditable, and an overall limit applies.
This means that foreign taxes imposed on high-taxed income of
Type A earned in Country X can be claimed as a credit against
United States taxes otherwise due on low-taxed income of Type B
earned in Country Y. To continue this example, royalties received
from industrial countries are generally similar to Type B. They
are taxed at low rates, usually under ten percent. Since many foreign tax rates on corporate income are higher than United States
tax rates, firms have an incentive to generate additional income
that is characterized as foreign source income under United
States tax laws, but which attracts low foreign tax rates.
In response to these tax-saving efforts by firms, a senior Treasury official, Daniel Halperin, recently suggested that Congress
should consider distinguishing between active and passive foreign
source income and impose separate foreign tax credit limits on
each. If translated into legislation, this suggestion would result in
higher total taxation of technology income received by United
States firms from foreign sources.29
28. U.S. Treas. Dep't, Office of Tax Analysis.
29. Statement of Daniel I. Halperin, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Legislation), before the Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management of the
Senate Committee on Finance, (Sept. 10, 1980) (unpublished as of March 1,

Spring 19811

UNITED STATES POLICY

D. Expense Allocation
Section 482 leaves unresolved the issue of what expenses should
be attributed to income from the sale or license of technology.
The attribution of expenses is important because indirectly it affects the allowable foreign tax credit. The allowable credit is limited to the amount of United States taxes that would otherwise
be imposed on the taxpayer's net foreign income. A correct apportionment of expenses is necessary in measuring a taxpayer's net
foreign source income.
Under section 862(a)(4) of the Code, royalties from patents and
trade secrets used outside the United States are foreign source
income. Section 862(b) provides, in turn, that expenses reasonably related to the royalty income shall be deducted for the purpose of determining taxable income. Regulation 1.861-8, which interprets the statute, provides taxpayers with detailed guidance for
apportioning their expenditures. A major portion of the regulation is devoted to the apportionment of research and development expenditures.
Research and development expenses undertaken solely to meet
United States health, safety, or pollution standards imposed by
federal, state, or local governments are allocated to domestic income. The remaining research and development expenses are apportioned between a taxpayer's domestic and foreign source income on the basis of either sales or gross income. Since the
apportionment reduces foreign source taxable income and, thus,
the allowable limit on the foreign tax credit, it may reduce the tax
benefit of research and development expenditures for a multinational firm that finds itself in an excess foreign tax credit position. Underlying the regulation, however, is a presumption that
technology importing countries should recognize the expenses of
generating technology in determining their own tax base, even
when the expenses are incurred in the United States. Moreover,
the regulation applies in mirror-image. Foreign parent companies
can use the regulation's most favorable provisions in allocating
their own foreign research and development expenses to the activities of their United States subsidiaries.
E. Bilateral Tax Treaties
The two basic jurisdictional standards for asserting tax liability
1981).
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are source and residence. Under the source standard, a country
asserts tax jurisdiction over patent royalties and other income
earned within its geographical territory. It makes no difference
who receives the income. Residents and nonresidents are both
taxed on income derived within the source jurisdiction. By contrast, under the residence principle, the residence of the taxpayer
is the relevant criterion. A patent royalty would be taxed where
the recipient of the royalty resides. These competing jurisdictional standards can give rise to double taxation. Double taxation
is especially likely when many countries impose taxes on the basis
of both source and residence jurisdiction. For example, the royalty on a patent used in Country A but licensed from an individual resident in Country B could be taxed in Country A asserting
source jurisdiction and in Country B asserting residence jurisdiction. Bilateral tax treaties are an important, vehicle for reducing
this sort of international double taxation. Major differences exist
between the approaches of the developed and developing countries in addressing the two major tax issues that affect the taxation of technology income, which are the deductibility of royalties
paid by the recipient of the technology and the appropriate rate
of the withholding tax levied by the country where the technology
is used.
1. Deduction of Royalties
With respect to the first issue, developed countries generally allow the user of technology to deduct the royalty as a business
expense. These countries follow the nondiscrimination article of
the OECD model income tax convention, which provides that
"royalties . . .paid by an enterprise of a Contracting State to a
resident of the other Contracting State shall, for the purpose of
determining the taxable profits of such enterprise, be deductible
under the same conditions as if it had been paid to a resident of
the first-mentioned State."" ° This paragraph is intended to prohibit discrimination based on residence.-3
Developing countries, in contrast, tend to restrict the deductibility of royalty payments to nonresidents. These countries view
royalties as a thinly-veiled profit distribution rather than as a legitimate expense of acquiring technology. The recently issued
30.
31.

OECD CONVENTION, supra note 24, art. 24(5).
TRANSFER PRICING, supra note 25, at 51.

Spring 19811

UNITED STATES POLICY

United Nations model tax treaty, however, frowns on deductibility restrictions aimed solely at nonresidents. It contains a nondiscrimination provision identical to the OECD model.3 2 The
treaty commentary recognizes that the paragraph "would not be
acceptable to those countries that made deductibility of disbursements made abroad by foreign-owned corporations conditional on
the recipient being taxed in such countries."' 3
2. Withholding Taxes
In the absence of a tax treaty, most countries impose withholding taxes on royalties arising within their borders and paid to
nonresidents. The term "withholding" is a misnomer since the
withholding tax is a final tax on distributions paid to foreign recipients, levied on the basis of source jurisdiction. It is a substitute for taxation at the regular rates applied to resident individuals and corporations. Withholding taxes frequently are levied on
gross royalties with no deduction for expenses. For example, in
the absence of a treaty, the United States statute calls for a thirty
percent withholding tax to be levied on gross royalty payments to
nonresidents. 4
The royalty article of the OECD model treaty assigns exclusive
taxation of royalties to the residence jurisdiction: "Royalties arising in a Contracting State and paid to a resident of the other
Contracting State shall be taxable only in that other State if such
owner is the beneficial owner of the royalties."3 Many of the tax
treaties between developed countries follow this principle. Therefore, treaty withholding rates on royalties paid between the
United States and developed countries are typically zero, with the
exception of treaties with Canada, France, and Japan which allow
low withholding taxes.
Because of their need for tax revenue and foreign exchange and
because technology transfer is primarily a one-way flow from developed countries, developing nations often are unwilling to follow the OECD model and grant exclusive taxation of royalties to
the residence country. The model treaty developed by the Andean Pact reverses the residence principle. The sole right to tax
32. OECD CONVENTION, supra note 24, art. 24(5).
33. U.N. CONVENTION supra note 25, at 222 (1980).
34. I.R.C. §§ 871, 881.
35. OECD CoNvENTION, supra note 24, art. 12(1).
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royalties is reserved to the country where the technology is used."
This issue was discussed extensively by the United Nations
Group of Experts on Tax Treaties between Developed and Developing Countries:
While one or two developing countries clung in principle to exclusivity of source jurisdiction, the developing countries on the whole
did not see this as a crucial issue. Instead the basic issue before the
United Nations Group involved the scope7 to be given source jurisdiction for the various items of income.1
The principle that emerged in the discussion by the Group of
Experts was primary, but not exclusive, source country taxation. 88
Accordingly, the royalties article of the United Nations model
treaty provides that:
royalties may also be taxed in the Contracting State in which they
arise and according to the laws of that State but if the recipient is
the beneficial owner of the royalties, the tax so charged shall not
exceed - percent [the percentage is to be established through bilateral negotiations] of the gross amount of the royalties.3 9
The commentary to the United Nations royalty article recommends that the source country recognize royalty-related expenses
in setting a withholding rate. In other words, the source country
should recognize that, when expenses are one-half of the gross
royalty, a tax of thirty percent on gross royalties is equivalent to a
tax of sixty percent on net income. The United Nations concedes,
however, that other factors are also likely to be considered, such
as the need for revenue and foreign exchange, the one-way flow of
royalty payments from developing countries, and "the desirability
of obtaining0 and encouraging a flow of technology to developing
4
countries."
F.

Domestic InternationalSales Corporation

The Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) legisla36. 60a CAHIERS DE DRorT FIscAL INTERNATIONAL (Studies on International
Fiscal Law) 14 (1975).
37. Surrey, United Nations Group of Experts and the Guidelines for Tax
Treaties Between Developed and Developing Countries, 19 HARv. INT'L L.J. 8-9

(1978).
38. Id. at 9.
39. OECD CONVENTION, supra note 24, art. 12(2).
40. U.N. CONVENTION, supra note 25, at 140.
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tion was designed to provide a lower tax rate on export profits or,
in statutory language, "qualified export receipts."4 1 A firm can
qualify for DISC benefits if, among other tests, it can show that
ninety-five percent of its receipts are qualified export receipts.
Qualified export receipts include certain services that are ancillary to the shipment of goods, for example:
(1) receipts for engineering or architectural services for construction projects located outside the United States;
(2) commissions on export sales;
(3) services which are related and subsidiary to the corporation's
own sales of export products or the sales on which it earns a
commission;
(4) managerial services provided to another DISC, including such
services as export market studies, provision of shipping arrangements and contacting potential foreign purchasers; and
(5) the interest earned on qualified export assets.4 2
Under these tests, the license of technology by a United States
firm to a foreign firm, unrelated to the sale of products, could not
be characterized as a qualified export receipt. The Carter Administration was unenthusiastic about widening the coverage of the
DISC statute to encompass more services because of revenue reasons and international obligations accepted by the United States
under the General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade Code on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.4 3
IV.

FINANCING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

The United States Government operates the following six major programs to provide financing and financial guarantees for international transactions: Export-Import Bank, Overseas Private
Investment Corporation, Foreign Military Sales Credit Program,
Economic Support Fund, Agency for International Development,
and Commodity Credit Corporation. None of these programs is
directly targeted on the technology transfer process, but each has
some impact on the international transfer of technology.

41." I.R.C. §§ 991-997.
42. Id. § 993(a)(1).
43. See statement by Secretary Philip Klutznick on Export Trading Companies, Export Trading Company Act of 1980: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Int'l Finance,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 257 (1980).
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Export-Import Bank

In fiscal year 1980 Export-Import Bank (EXIMBANK) programs supported about $15 billion of United States exports.
About $5 billion of direct credits and $7.9 billion of guarantees
were extended. The supported exports were partly financed by
cash payments and credit extended by private sources including
the exporter. Technology exports are an incidental beneficiary of
an export promotion program established for other reasons. Disproportionate amounts of EXIMBANK financial support are
used to assist high technology exports because United States export strength is concentrated in high-technology capital goods
and credit terms are more important to the overall cost of a capital good than an intermediate good. EXIMBANK supported
about eight percent of all United States exports, but about eighteen percent of United States capital goods exports.
The EXIMBANK has not yet financed the export of technology
separate from the export of goods. In principle, a straight patent
sale or long-term licensing agreement could be financed. The few
transactions of this sort that have been presented to the EXIMBANK have not seemed suitable because alternative private
market financing appeared to be available. When it decides to
finance the export of capital goods, the EXIMBANK will also
finance related technical services and associated know-how. The
EXIMBANK examines the transaction to ensure that its financing is limited to an appropriate percentage of the cost of developing the technology transferred. While these costs may bear little
relationship to the market value of the technology, the EXIMBANK wants to protect itself against subsequent complaints
that part of the debt corresponds to "water."
Its enabling legislation requires the EXIMBANK to take into
account the possible adverse effects on the United States economy that might result from technology transfers. French, German, Japanese, and other foreign suppliers are usually ready to
sell the same capital equipment. that the EXIMBANK would
finance on behalf of a United States exporter. Therefore, analysis
usually reveals that the foreign plant will be built in any event,
ensuring competitive pressure in the relevant market for final
goods. The main consequence that would flow from an EXIMBANK decision not to support the United States capital goods
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exporter would be the loss of an export sale.""
B.

Overseas Private Investment Corporation

In fiscal year 1980 the Overseas' Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) wrote approximately $1.1 billion of new insurance
coverage on foreign investments of United States corporations.
Inconvertibility, expropriation, and war-risk are the three types
of coverage written.4 5 OPIC was not designed to promote exports
of technology. Its development mandate, however, spelled out in
the enabling legislation, has been given increasing emphasis. One
favorable item in evaluating whether development objectives are
served by a particular project is whether a recognizable technology transfer can be identified. Indirectly, therefore, technology
transfers are assigned weight in OPIC insurance programs.
OPIC insurance normally covers equity and debt contributions
to the foreign enterprise. The normal measure of eligible coverage
is the value of cash and equipment transferred to the enterprise.
OPIC insurance cannot cover pure goodwill transferred abroad. It
can, however, cover prospective royalty payments for patents and
know-how transferred under a technical assistance agreement.
Perhaps the most useful feature of OPIC insurance, from the
standpoint of royalty recipients, is the protection against inconvertibility. When inconvertibility of a developing country currency occurs, the parent firm simply assigns its blocked account
to OPIC and receives dollars. Expropriation and war-risk coverage only insure those royalty payments that have accrued up to
the point of confiscation or war destruction.
C. Foreign Military Sales Credits
The United States Government finances a portion of the foreign sales of military equipment. In fiscal year 1980 new credits
extended under the Foreign Military Sales credit program
amounted to about $2 billion. Ordinarily the financing is limited
to the original equipment. An initial order of spare parts, ammu44. Statement by Raymond J. Albright, Vice-President, Export-Import Bank
of the United States, before the Joint Hearings on the Committee on Science
and Technology (June 24, 1980) (unpublished as of March 1, 1981).
45. Since a given investment can "die" only once, the gross figure for insurance overstates the maximum amount of claims that could be filed against
OPIC.
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nition, and technical services may be financed as part of the original equipment sale. In exceptional circumstances, these renewable
supplies may be financed in isolation. With pressure from the
State Department, exceptional circumstances are becoming a
more frequent event.
No distinction is made in repayment terms or interest rates between original equipment and renewable supplies, including technical services. Credit agreements ordinarily call for repayment
over a period of seven to twelve years, with interest rates set a
fraction of a percent over the Treasury bond rate.
Foreign military sales and credits are evaluated by the Security
Assistance Program Review Committee, an interagency body
chaired by the State Department. This Committee puts together
a recommended program that is sent to the Arms Export Control
Board and usually approved and forwarded to the Secretary of
State. The bureaucratic review usually focuses on the size and
components of the country assistance program rather than the
nature of financial details. In other words, once the physical package is designed, financing is usually determined on the basis of
the country's foreign exchange position and development status.
D. Economic Support Fund
The Economic Support Fund, which is managed by the State
Department, is designed to assist the political and military allies
of the United States. In fiscal year 1980 it provided about $2.5
billion of concessional credit for budget support purposes. In recent years, the major beneficiaries have been Israel and Egypt.
Few, if any, procurement strings are attached to the use of the
funds. Accordingly, technology transfers are a small, incidental
feature in the program.
E. Agency for InternationalDevelopment
Technology transfer to less developed countries can take place
through the mechanism of development assistance. In fiscal year
1979, the Agency for International Development (AID) committed $1.7 million in grants, loans, and guarantees to the poorest
lesser developed countries. 46 AID's evolving policy of attending to
46.

Development Issues: U.S. Actions Affecting the Development of Low In-

come Countries, The 1980 Annual Report of the Chairman of the Development
Coordination Committee (Mar. 15, 1980) (unpublished as of March 1, 1981).
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basic human needs in the less developed countries does not often
result in the transfer of proprietary technology. Instead, agriculture, rural development, nutrition, and family planning programs,
using technology in the public domain, account for more than
sixty percent of AID's commitments.
V.

CONCLUSION

This capsule review should indicate the substantial conceptual
and practical hurdles that stand in the way of anyone seized with
the ambition of designing an effective and coherent technology
transfer policy. At best, three weakly-implemented organizing
principles can be discerned in existing policies. These are discrimination on the basis of geography, post-transfer control, and de"
gree of embodiment. These organizing principles, and the consequent discrimination between technology transfer transactions,
have not been carefully scrutinized, clearly articulated, or widely
accepted. Much conceptual work should precede any attempt to
implement these or converse principles in any systematic or vigorous fashion.
Present technology transfer control mechanisms were mainly
created as a by-product of other policies. Their design and implementation is scattered throughout the federal government. It is
difficult to believe that technology transfer issues will become sufficiently important for basic tax policies, finance policies, or patent policies to be modified to implement the goals of a hypothetical technology control board. Nevertheless, a systematic review of
the technology transfer implications of basic policies designed for
other purposes would seem worthwhile.

